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ABSTRACT 
A number of federal circuit courts have refused to apply the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from GPS vehicle 
trackers that were installed and monitored without a warrant before United 
States v. Jones. Those courts have largely reached that result by invoking Davis 
v. United States’s holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply where an
officer reasonably relied on binding appellate precedent that was later 
overruled. More specifically, the circuit courts have viewed the Supreme 
Court’s 1983 decision in United States v. Knotts (addressing “beeper” tracking 
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devices) as binding precedent that specifically authorized the warrantless 
installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stephens is 
representative of the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach” that 
most of the circuit courts have used to resolve the exclusionary rule question. 
This Article, therefore, uses Stephens as a vehicle for analyzing that approach. 
This Article argues that decisions like Stephens have stretched the holding of 
Davis and interpreted Knotts in a way that contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent. And, the circuit courts have done so for no good reason because they 
could have reached the same result—refusing to exclude the GPS vehicle 
tracker evidence—by working through the general good-faith analysis. Instead, 
most of the circuit courts have chosen to resolve the exclusionary rule issue by 
defining the terms “specifically authorized” and “binding precedent” to mean 
“suggested” and “persuasive precedent.” In the process, the courts have 
converted the intentionally narrow holding of Davis into a broad decision with 
unknown boundaries. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis v. United States1 
seems straightforward: “We hold that searches conducted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the 
exclusionary rule.”2 Those words, however, have proven to be anything but 
straightforward. Identifying the scope of Davis’s holding has generated much 
controversy in the lower courts
3
 and the legal academy.
4
 
1  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
2  Id. at 2423–24. 
3  Compare United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the 
government’s good-faith argument and reading Davis narrowly), with United States v. Stephens, 
764 F.3d 327, 337 (4th Cir. 2014) (adopting the government’s good-faith argument and 
“expressing serious doubts” about the defendant’s narrow interpretation of Davis), cert. denied, 
2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313), and United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 
177–79 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (divided en banc decision accepting the government’s good-
faith argument and vacating prior panel decision that rejected the good-faith argument based on a 
narrow reading of Davis), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015). 
4  See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, The Davis Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to the 
Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 341, 357–61 (2013) (explaining the competing 
interpretations of Davis and arguing in favor of a narrow reading of the Court’s opinion); Orin 
Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. 
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 255 (discussing Davis 
and the future direction of the exclusionary rule); Caleb Mason, New Police Surveillance 
Technologies and the Good-Faith Exception: Warrantless GPS Tracker Evidence After United 
States v. Jones, 13 NEV. L.J. 60, 63–64 (2012) (disagreeing with Professor Tomkovicz and 
reading Davis as a “straightforward adoption” of the rule that reliance on binding precedent does 
not trigger the exclusionary rule); James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion 
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Much of the controversy has occurred in cases involving the 
installation and subsequent monitoring of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) 
vehicle trackers.
5
 More specifically, the courts have been grappling with 
whether the exclusionary rule applies to information obtained from GPS 
vehicle trackers that were installed and monitored before January 23, 2012—
the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones.6 The Jones 
Court held that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when police officers 
install and then monitor a GPS vehicle tracker.
7
 The Court reached that result 
by resuscitating a Fourth Amendment theory that most believed had been dead 
for decades: trespass law.
8
 
Prior to Jones, it was widely believed that installation and monitoring 
of a GPS vehicle tracker did not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search,” so 
long as the monitoring occurred only on public roadways.
9
 That belief was 
grounded in two Supreme Court cases from the 1980s—United States v. 
Knotts
10
 and United States v. Karo
11—that dealt with location information 
obtained from a precursor to GPS technology colloquially referred to as a 
Revolution Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 382 (2011) (arguing that Davis “confirms the 
advent of a new era of exclusionary rule development, reflecting the Roberts Court’s 
commitment to a revolutionary, and stifling, revision of the Fourth Amendment bar to illegally 
obtained evidence”). 
5  See, e.g., Katzin, 769 F.3d at 168–69, 171–73 (vacating panel decision and discussing the 
application of Davis to cases involving the installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers); 
United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir.) (recognizing the “legitimate debate” over 
the application of Davis to cases involving the installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle 
trackers), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 378 (2014). 
6  132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
7  See id. 
8  See id. at 949–50; see also Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post-
United States v. Jones Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
553, 555–56 (2015) (referring to the property-based rationale used by the Jones Court as an 
analysis that “was thought long dead”). 
9  See United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 229 (3d Cir. 2013) (Van Antwerpen, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases and recognizing that there had been “a uniform consensus across the 
federal courts of appeals to address the issue that the installation and subsequent use of GPS or a 
GPS-like device was not a search or, at most, was a search but did not require a warrant”); United 
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125–27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that installation and 
monitoring of a GPS device was not a Fourth Amendment “search”),  partially abrogated by 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), as recognized in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
688 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Rayford, 556 F. App’x 678, 679 
n.2 (10th Cir. 2014) (pointing out that prior to Jones most courts believed the police did not need
a warrant to install and monitor GPS vehicle trackers); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 
609–10 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating in dicta that the warrantless use of a GPS device to track the 
defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
10  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
11  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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“beeper.”12 Both Knotts and Karo applied the tried-and-true reasonable 
expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States
13
 to determine whether a 
Fourth Amendment “search” occurred.14 
The Jones Court’s reliance on trespass law instead of the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test was unanticipated,
15
 and it caused 
considerable angst in the law enforcement community.
16
 That angst was 
understandable; at the moment Jones was decided, there were thousands of 
GPS vehicle trackers being monitored by police agencies nationwide.
17
 Very 
few of those were installed and monitored with judicial approval.
18
 Given the 
generally accepted belief that Knotts and Karo authorized GPS tracking on 
public roadways, the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle 
trackers was standard police practice.
19
 Indeed, it was United States 
Department of Justice policy not to seek a warrant to monitor a GPS device on 
public roadways.
20
 So, the question raised in courtrooms nationwide in the 
12  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 (“A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, 
which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”); see also Ian Herbert, 
Note, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and the 
Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 467–76 (2011) 
(explaining how the “beeper” used in Knotts worked and comparing it to newer location-tracking 
technology, including GPS). 
13  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
14  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (applying the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test 
and concluding that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another”); see also Karo, 
468 U.S. at 712–15 (applying the Katz test and distinguishing Knotts because the beeper in Karo 
was monitored while inside of a home, a place (unlike the public roadways) where the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
15  See Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States v. 
Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 690 (2013) (explaining that “many were 
left utterly shocked by the Court’s almost total rejection” of Katz, Knotts, and Karo “in favor of a 
doctrine that most believed was dead—the ‘trespass doctrine’”). 
16  See Carrie Johnson, FBI Still Struggling with Supreme Court’s GPS Ruling, NPR (Mar. 
21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/21/149011887/fbi-still-struggling-with-supreme-courts-
gps-ruling (reporting that “Jones set off alarm bells inside the FBI, where officials are trying to 
figure out whether they need to change the way they do business”). 
17  See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-
1259),  2011 WL 5360051, at *59 (estimating that federal law enforcement agencies annually 
installed GPS devices “in the low thousands”). 
18  See Johnson, supra note 16. 
19  See generally United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2014) (reporting that 
the officer who installed the GPS vehicle tracker at issue “had attached a GPS to other vehicles in 
public areas without a warrant, and it was his understanding that a warrant was needed only 
when . . . the GPS was wired into the vehicle’s battery system”), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 
(U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313). 
20  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (reporting that 
prior to Jones, the Department of Justice policy was “that a warrant was not required to install a 
2015] THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION AFTER DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 647 
wake of Jones was (and continues to be) as follows: Does the exclusionary rule 
apply to evidence obtained from GPS vehicle trackers that were installed and 
monitored without a warrant before Jones? 
In seeking to answer that question, the courts have run head-on into 
Davis’s holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply where officers relied 
in good faith on binding precedent that was later overruled. The question has 
now been considered by almost all of the federal circuit courts
21
 and a handful 
of state appellate courts.
22
 The vast majority of the courts have refused to apply 
the exclusionary rule on the basis that the officers who installed and monitored 
the GPS vehicle trackers pre-Jones acted in good faith. With the exception of 
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
23
 the federal appellate courts have reached that 
conclusion by holding that the Supreme Court’s decision regarding “beepers” 
in Knotts (or a circuit court decision authorizing the use of “beepers”) qualified 
under Davis as binding precedent specifically authorizing the installation and 
monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
24
 Those courts have endorsed a broad 
battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public street and to surveil it on public roads”), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015). 
21  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 781 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Katzin, 
769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); United States v. 
Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 676 (2014); United States v. Brown, 744 
F.3d 474 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 378 (2014); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 
(2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 400 (2014); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 
F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
204 (2013); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2814 
(2013); United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 704 
(2014); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
994 (2013). 
22  See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); People v. LeFlore, 32 
N.E.3d 1043 (Ill. 2015); Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); State v. Johnson, 
22 N.E.3d 1061 (Ohio 2014); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 2014). 
23  The Ninth Circuit had a prior published decision that specifically authorized the 
warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. See United States v. McIver, 186 
F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1999), partially abrogated by United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), as recognized in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012). 
The Ninth Circuit relied on its prior decision in McIver to conclude that the exclusionary rule was 
inappropriate under Davis because the installation and monitoring of the GPS vehicle tracker 
complied with binding circuit court precedent that was later overruled. See Pineda-Moreno, 688 
F.3d at 1090 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule under Davis because prior “circuit 
precedent held that placing an electronic tracking device on the undercarriage of a car was 
neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment”). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit relied 
on one of its prior decisions in Fisher to conclude that precedent provided binding authority 
permitting the police to use the GPS tracker. Fisher, 745 F.3d at 203 (discussing United States v. 
Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
24  See, e.g., United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1448 (2015); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 
WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313); United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 676 (2014); United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
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reading of Davis and have rejected the defendants’ claims that Davis only 
applies in the rare circumstance where there is a prior published decision from 
the governing circuit court that directly addresses the precise issue raised in the 
current case.
25
 
The Fourth Circuit’s 2-1 decision in United States v. Stephens26 is 
representative of the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach.” The 
Stephens majority and the dissent fully addressed the arguments on both sides; 
therefore, Stephens is an excellent vehicle for discussing and analyzing the 
applicability of Davis to the pre-Jones installation and monitoring of GPS 
vehicle trackers. The Stephens majority—like many of its sister circuits—
scoffed at the defendant’s narrow interpretation of Davis and held that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained from a GPS vehicle 
tracker that was installed and monitored without a warrant.
27
 Although the 
Stephens majority admitted there was no binding Fourth Circuit precedent 
specifically authorizing the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS 
vehicle trackers, the Court opined that “a reasonably well-trained officer in this 
Circuit could have relied on [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Knotts as 
permitting” such conduct.28 Similar reasoning can be found in opinions from 
the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
29
 
Judge Stephanie Thacker sharply disagreed with the Stephens majority. 
She argued in her dissent that the holding of Davis was a “specific and narrow” 
one that required “binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing” the 
warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
30
 Because 
there was no such precedent in the Fourth Circuit, Judge Thacker would have 
concluded that Davis’s good-faith rationale did not apply.31 Judge Thacker’s 
dissent mirrored the approach of the five judges who dissented from the Third 
Circuit’s en banc determination that Knotts qualified as binding precedent 
135 S. Ct. 378 (2014); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
204 (2013); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 400 
(2014); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2814 (2013); 
United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 704 (2014); 
United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013). 
25  See, e.g., Katzin, 769 F.3d at 176 (“Undoubtedly, certain language in Davis invites a 
narrow reading, but we are not persuaded this interpretation is true to Davis’[s] holding.”). 
26  764 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-
1313). 
27  See id. at 337–38. 
28  See id. at 338. 
29  See, e.g., Katzin, 769 F.3d 163; Brown, 744 F.3d 474; Sparks, 711 F.3d 58; Aguiar, 737 
F.3d 251; Andres, 703 F.3d 828; Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865; Smith, 741 F.3d 1211.  
30  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 341 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
31  Id. at 341–42. 
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under Davis.
32
 Several state appellate courts have also echoed Judge Thacker’s 
thoughts on the issue.
33
 
This Article examines the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis 
approach” and explains why such an approach is inconsistent with Supreme 
Court precedent. This Article also argues that the circuit courts should have 
resolved cases like Stephens by applying the general “good-faith” analysis. Part 
II discusses the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with a particular focus on 
the good-faith exception. Part III provides a brief summary of the majority and 
dissenting opinions from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stephens. Part IV 
analyzes the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach” that has been 
adopted by Stephens and most other circuit courts. It argues that a better 
approach would have been for the courts to resolve the exclusionary rule issue 
by simply applying the general good-faith analysis. Part V considers how the 
broad reading of Davis that underlies the “Knotts is binding precedent under 
Davis approach” will play out in future cases, such as those involving the 
application of the exclusionary rule to cell phone searches conducted before the 
Supreme Court’s recent watershed decision in Riley v. California.34 A brief 
conclusion follows in Part VI. 
32  See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 187–97 (Greenaway, J., dissenting). Judge Greenaway was the 
author of the Third Circuit’s panel decision, which applied the exclusionary rule and found that 
Knotts did not qualify as binding appellate precedent under Davis. Id. The en banc Third Circuit 
vacated the panel decision and held eight to five that the evidence was saved from suppression by 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. (“[W]e conclude that the good faith 
exception applies, and that suppression is unwarranted.”). 
33  See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that Knotts 
was “not sufficiently apposite on the trespass question and, therefore, cannot trigger application 
of the good-faith exception” under Davis v. United States); State v. Hohn, 321 P.3d 799 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2014) (unpublished table decision) (holding that it “was clearly unreasonable for the State 
to have read Karo and Knotts as authorizing the warrantless installation of a [GPS] tracking 
device” on the defendant’s car); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 346–47 (S.C. 2014) (applying 
the exclusionary rule and concluding that “Knotts and Karo did not constitute binding precedent 
that authorized law enforcement’s warrantless” installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle 
tracker). 
34  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). The Court in Riley held that police officers must obtain a 
warrant before searching a cell phone, even if the cell phone was found on the defendant’s person 
at the time of his lawful arrest. Id. at 2485. In reaching that conclusion, the Court carved out an 
exception to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine—a doctrine that allows police officers 
who make a lawful arrest to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person, including 
containers found on the arrestee’s person. Id. at 2483–84. 
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has long been 
controversial.
35
 And, the rule’s development has been anything but smooth. 
Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart once referred to the exclusionary rule as “a bit 
jerry-built—like a roller coaster track constructed while the roller coaster sped 
along.”36 In the years since its creation in 1914, the exclusionary rule has 
certainly taken many twists and turns. Perhaps the most significant twists and 
turns have occurred in the last decade—a time period during which the 
Supreme Court issued a number of important decisions regarding the 
exclusionary rule’s scope. The following sections explain the current status of 
the exclusionary rule and describe the road the Court took to get there. 
A. The Road to Davis v. United States 
The exclusionary rule, generally speaking, prevents the prosecution 
from introducing evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.
37
 Although the general rule is easy enough to recite, its precise 
scope has been the source of ongoing debate and continual change.
38
 That has 
been especially true in the last nine years as the Supreme Court has handed 
down three important decisions: Hudson v. Michigan,
39
 Herring v. United 
States,
40
 and Davis v. United States.
41
 Depending on who one believes, those 
three decisions have either dramatically modified the exclusionary rule
42
 or 
have simply returned the exclusionary rule to its original moorings.
43
 
35  See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (discussing the development of the 
exclusionary rule and stating that the rule “has for decades been the subject of ardent 
controversy”). 
36  Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclnsionary [sic] Rule in Search-and-Seiznre [sic] Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1365, 1366 (1983). 
37  See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (“When evidence is obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a 
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.”). 
38  See Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 384–94 (discussing how the exclusionary rule has 
evolved with time); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning 
the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2014) (opining that the “Supreme Court 
has recently directed a sustained legal assault against the exclusionary rule”). 
39  547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
40  555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
41  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
42  See id. at 2440 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s recent exclusionary rule 
decisions and expressing “fear” that the Court has undermined and “watered-down” the 
exclusionary rule); see also Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and 
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First recognized by the Supreme Court in 1914
44
 and incorporated to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1961,
45
 the exclusionary rule 
is nowhere to be found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
46
 It is a judicially 
created remedy that was initially viewed as serving two purposes: (1) deterring 
unconstitutional police conduct
47
 and (2) maintaining judicial integrity.
48
 For a 
period of time after its creation, the exclusionary rule was viewed as “a self-
executing” constitutional mandate that required no further analysis.49 If there 
was a Fourth Amendment violation, then the evidence was automatically 
excluded.
50
 That began to change over time, however, as the Court recognized 
numerous exceptions. 
Burden of Proof, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 164 (2015) (stating that through cases like Herring and 
Davis, the Supreme Court has “clearly changed the suppression landscape”). 
43  See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (insisting that the exclusionary rule “has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse,” while recognizing that over the years some opinions “did not 
always speak so guardedly”). 
44  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (“We therefore reach the conclusion 
that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United 
States, acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the 
defendant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was heard and 
passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the 
constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters to the 
accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was 
committed.”), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45  See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been 
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is 
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal 
Government.”); see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 757 (2009) 
(explaining that “the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio gave full effect to the Fourth Amendment 
by extending the suppression remedy of Weeks v. United States to cases in the state courts as 
well”). 
46  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . 
‘contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
commands.’” (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995))); see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661 
(Black, J., concurring) (recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any 
provision expressly precluding the use of [unconstitutionally obtained] evidence”). 
47  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (stating that the “purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by 
removing the incentive to disregard it’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1960))). 
48  Id. at 659 (explaining that “there is another consideration—the imperative of judicial 
integrity” (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217)). 
49  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). 
50  See Ferguson, supra note 38, at 625 (explaining that the exclusionary rule was “once an 
automatic remedy for constitutional violations”). 
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Those exceptions include the independent source doctrine,
51
 the 
inevitable discovery doctrine,
52
 the attenuation doctrine,
53
 and—of particular 
importance to the current discussion—the good-faith exception.54 The good-
faith exception was announced in United States v. Leon.
55
 In Leon, the Court 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule where an officer reasonably relied on a 
magistrate’s issuance of a warrant that was later found to be invalid.56 The 
rationale of Leon was applied in Illinois v. Krull to prevent the exclusion of 
evidence where an officer reasonably relied on a legislative enactment later 
determined to be unconstitutional.
57
 It was also applied in Arizona v. Evans to 
prevent the exclusion of evidence where an officer reasonably relied on court-
managed databases later found to be inaccurate.
58
 Leon, Krull, and Evans all 
shared one key attribute—the good-faith reliance of a police officer on an 
erroneous act by either the judicial or legislative branches of government.
59
 At 
the time they were announced, the exceptions were exactly that—exceptions. 
The general rule for evidence obtained in connection with a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment remained exclusion. 
That paradigm began to shift dramatically in 2006 when the Court 
announced its decision in Hudson v. Michigan.
60
 Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Hudson majority, refused to apply the exclusionary rule where officers violated 
51  See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (holding that evidence originally 
discovered illegally may be admitted if such evidence was also later discovered in a manner that 
was independent of the initial illegality). 
52  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained from an 
illegal search may be admitted if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the evidence would have “ultimately or inevitably . . . been discovered by lawful means”). 
53  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 471 (1963) (holding that illegally 
discovered evidence may be admitted if the connection between the illegal search and the 
evidence has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” (quoting Nardone v. United States, 
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939))). 
54  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
55  Id. at 908–09. 
56  Id. at 913. 
57  See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
58  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9–16 (1995). 
59  See Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not To Exclude: The Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 181 (2009) 
(explaining that before Herring, the Court “only applied the ‘good faith’ exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule in situations where police acted in reasonable reliance on a 
judicial or legislative representation that authorized the police conduct”). 
60  547 U.S. 586 (2006); see Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan: The Supreme Court Knocks 
and Announces the Demise of the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV. 751, 755 (2007) (stating 
that the Court in Hudson “fundamentally altered the traditional application of the exclusionary 
rule”). 
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the Fourth Amendment’s knock and announce requirement.61 Hudson ushered 
in a new era of Fourth Amendment law—an era where the exclusionary rule is 
the judiciary’s “last resort, not our first impulse.”62 While the Court recognized 
that some of its prior cases did not “speak so guardedly” about the exclusionary 
rule, Hudson explained that evidence should only be excluded when the 
deterrent value of exclusion exceeds the “substantial social costs” of letting 
guilty people go free.
63
 Whereas the exclusionary rule was initially viewed as 
serving the dual purposes of deterrence and the maintenance of judicial 
integrity, Hudson not so covertly signaled that deterrence was the principal 
rationale going forward.
64
 
The signal from Hudson became a command three years later in 
Herring v. United States.
65
 The specific holding in Herring was that the good-
faith exception applied to an officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on a law 
enforcement database that was later found to be inaccurate.
66
 The Court’s 
holding was significant because it extended the good-faith exception to an error 
committed by a law enforcement entity, as opposed to another branch of 
government.
67
 But, Herring is less important for what it specifically held than 
for the broad doctrine-changing language that is littered throughout the 
opinion.
68
 
61  See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594. 
62  Id. at 591; see Ferguson, supra note 38, at 631 (writing that prior to Hudson “Supreme 
Court opinions assumed with little difficulty an intrinsic link between the exclusionary rule and 
unconstitutional action, without any separation of rights and remedies”); see also Blair, supra 
note 60, at 760 (“The decision in Hudson has now made it possible to so finely delineate the 
interests protected by various parts of the Fourth Amendment that the exclusionary rule sanction 
will not be an appropriate remedy for some constitutional violations.”). 
63  Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 596 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
64  Id. at 596, 599. 
65  555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
66  Id. 
67  See Josephson, supra note 59, at 181; see also Claire Angelique Nolasco, Rolando V. del 
Carmen & Michael S. Vaughn, What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring Cases 
in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 227 (2011) (explaining that prior to Herring, the 
good-faith exception case law “did not address whether the exclusionary rule applied to illegal 
searches made by law enforcement officers in good-faith reliance on mistakes made by other law 
enforcement employees”). 
68  See Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 390 (stating that the “Herring majority . . . was not 
content merely to resolve this narrow issue,” opting instead to speak “quite broadly” about the 
exclusionary rule); see also LaFave, supra note 45, at 758 (criticizing Herring and speculating on 
how the Court’s decision will alter the application of the exclusionary rule going forward); see 
also Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe 
to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1203–04 (2012) 
(stating that Herring contained “big blast” language that signaled the Court’s intent to “restrict 
the exclusionary rule to instances of culpable police behavior”). 
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The Herring Court made clear that the exclusionary rule is a remedy 
that must be analyzed separately from the determination of whether there was a 
constitutional violation.
69
 In the words of the Court, “that a search or arrest was 
unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.”70 
Rather, the exclusionary rule only applies if the officer’s conduct was 
“deliberate, reckless, . . . grossly negligent” or the result of “recurring or 
systemic negligence.”71 The language and tone of Herring has led some 
scholars to declare that the exclusionary rule is now best understood as less of a 
“rule” and more of an exception that only applies when the deterrent value of 
suppression outweighs the societal cost of excluding highly probative evidence 
of guilt.
72
 The Herring Court focused entirely on “deterrence and culpability” 
with not a mention of Mapp v. Ohio’s judicial integrity rationale.73 In a passage 
that would prove important two years later in Davis, the Court reiterated that 
the good-faith exception saves evidence from suppression if, under the 
circumstances, “a reasonably well trained officer” would have believed the 
search was lawful.
74
 
69  See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (pointing out that “suppression is not an automatic 
consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); see also Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that an 
officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by making a reasonable mistake of law, and 
pointing out that the better approach would be to handle the officer’s reasonable mistake of law 
at the “remedial” step because “[o]ur jurisprudence draws a sharp ‘analytica[l] distinct[ion]’ 
between the existence of a Fourth Amendment violation and the remedy for that violation” 
(quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011))); see also Ferguson, supra note 
38, at 625 (explaining that Herring represents “new territory for lawyers and courts accustomed 
to an automatic linkage between constitutional wrongs and constitutional remedies”). 
70  Herring, 555 U.S. at 140. 
71  Id. 
72  See Josephson, supra note 59, at 176–77 (characterizing Herring as a “landmark criminal 
procedure opinion” that “could transform the exclusionary rule by making the exclusion of 
evidence the exception rather than the rule”); see also Maclin & Rader, supra note 68, at 1208 
(explaining that “[i]f under Herring, only culpable or deliberate violations of the Fourth 
Amendment merit suppression, then a great number—perhaps the overwhelming majority—of 
unreasonable searches and seizures will be immunized from the exclusionary rule”). 
73  See Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (“The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting 
guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something that ‘offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system.’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984))); see also 
id. at 147 (explaining that “the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh 
any harm to the justice system”). 
74  See id. at 145 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, for the proposition that “our good-faith 
inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances”). 
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B. Davis v. United States 
In 2011, the Court released its much-anticipated opinion in Davis v. 
United States.
75
 The precise question before the Court was whether the 
exclusionary rule should apply to searches conducted in reliance on binding 
precedent that was later overruled.
76
 To understand the Court’s conclusion and 
reasoning, a brief overview of the factual and procedural history of the case is 
in order. 
During the course of a routine traffic stop in 2007, local police officers 
in Alabama arrested Willie Davis (a passenger in the car) for lying about his 
identity.
77
 The officers handcuffed Davis and secured him in the backseat of a 
police cruiser.
78
 The officers then searched the passenger compartment of the 
car where they found a handgun in Davis’s jacket.79 Davis—a convicted 
felon—was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
80
 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the gun on the 
ground that it was found during a warrantless search that was unsupported by 
probable cause.
81
 
The trial court gave Davis’s argument short shrift.82 After all, it was 
well settled that the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in New York v. Belton83 
authorized police officers to search a car’s passenger compartment without a 
warrant or probable cause so long as there was a lawful arrest of a recent 
occupant.
84
 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit (and every other circuit for that matter) 
had specifically upheld searches in cases with facts nearly identical to those in 
75  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
76  Id. at 2423 (“The question here is whether to apply [the exclusionary rule] when the police 
conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.”). 
77  Id. at 2425. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 2425–26. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 2426 (pointing out that at the district court level Davis conceded that his argument 
was foreclosed by binding precedent). 
83  453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogated by Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419. The Belton Court held that 
when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of an automobile he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search without a warrant or probable cause the passenger compartment of 
the automobile and any containers found therein. Id. at 460–61. 
84  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“It was widely 
understood that the Court [in Belton] had issued a bright-line rule, and that vehicle searches 
incident to the arrest of recent occupants were reasonable, regardless of whether the arrestee ‘was 
within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search.’”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 
(2015). 
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Davis.
85
 As Davis’s appeal was grinding its way through the system, however, 
the Supreme Court did an about-face with its 2009 decision in Arizona v. 
Gant.
86
 The Gant Court held that officers may only search a car incident to a 
lawful arrest of a recent occupant if: (1) the arrestee is unsecured and within the 
grabbing area of the car during the search; or (2) there is reason to believe that 
evidence related to the crime of arrest will be found in the car.
87
 
In light of Gant, the Eleventh Circuit found in Davis that the officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched the car.
88
 But the Eleventh 
Circuit refused to exclude the gun because the officers relied in good faith on 
prior binding precedent that specifically authorized the search.
89
 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by Justice Alito.
90
 
Picking up where Herring left off, the Davis Court reinforced the 
notion that the exclusionary rule is a punitive device that should only be used in 
response to police conduct that was “deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningful’ 
deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth the price paid by the justice 
system.’”91 Reasoning that an officer who follows binding precedent should be 
faulted no more than an officer who follows a magistrate judge’s probable 
cause determination (Leon),
92
 a legislative enactment (Krull),
93
 a court 
85  See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822, 824–27 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 
no Fourth Amendment violation where officers searched the defendant’s car incident to his 
lawful arrest after he was handcuffed and secured away from the car); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2424 (recognizing that “Belton was widely understood to have set down a simple, bright-line 
rule . . . authoriz[ing] automobile searches incident to arrests of recent occupants, regardless of 
whether the arrestee in any particular case was within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time 
of the search”). 
86  556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
87  Id. at 342–43. 
88  United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, Davis, 131 S. Ct. 
2419 (“There can be no serious dispute that the search here violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment 
rights as defined in Gant.”). 
89  Id. at 1264 (“We now enter the fray and hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on our well-settled precedent, 
even if that precedent is subsequently overruled.”). 
90  Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Kagan. Id. at 2423. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the 
judgment. Id. at 2434. Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice 
Ginsburg. Id. at 2436. 
91  Id. at 2428 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
92  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (“We conclude that the marginal or 
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion.”). 
93  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987) (“The application of the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute 
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computer database (Evans),
94
 or a law enforcement database (Herring),
95
 the 
Court concluded that “evidence obtained during a search conducted in 
reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary 
rule.”96 In her solo concurrence, Justice Sotomayor opined that the Court’s 
decision should not be read as addressing the “markedly different question” of 
whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law is in flux and there is no 
binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing the officer’s conduct.97 
That “markedly different question” is one of many left unanswered by 
the Court’s holding in Davis.98 Clearly, the exclusionary rule does not apply 
when an officer conducts a search that was specifically authorized by a prior 
published opinion from the governing federal circuit court. But how close do 
the facts of the current case and the prior case need to be in order for the 
officer’s conduct to be specifically authorized by the prior case?99 What if a 
court opinion suggests that the officer’s search would be permitted, “or leaves a 
bunch of clues, without definitively resolving the question?”100 Does Davis 
apply if the governing circuit court has not addressed a particular issue, but the 
overwhelming weight of authority from the other circuits supports the officer’s 
conduct?
101
 These are the difficult questions that have confronted the circuit 
courts, including the Fourth Circuit in Stephens. And, the approach the Fourth 
would have as little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence 
when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.”). 
94  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (“There is no indication that the arresting 
officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record. 
Application of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for 
clerical errors of court employees.”). 
95  Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48 (“[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the result of 
negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of 
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence [achieved by application of the exclusionary 
rule] does not ‘pay its way.’”). 
96  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429. 
97  Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
98  See Mason, supra note 4, at 67–72 (discussing some of the questions raised by the Court’s 
decision in Davis). 
99  See Kerr, supra note 4, at 255 n.78 (noting that “[e]xactly what counts as ‘binding’ 
precedent [under Davis] can be unclear”); see also Orin Kerr, Lower Court Interpretations of 
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 14, 2013, 3:49 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2013/08/14/lower-court-interpretations-of-davis-v-united-states-131-s-ct-
2419-2011/ [hereinafter Lower Court Interpretations of Davis] (posing questions about the scope 
of Davis’s holding). 
100  See Lower Court Interpretations of Davis, supra note 99. 
101  See id.; see also Freiwald, supra note 4, at 365–66 (discussing whether Davis applies 
where there is persuasive authority from other circuits but no binding authority in the circuit 
where the search occurred); Mason, supra note 4, at 72–79 (analyzing how Davis could be 
potentially applied in a host of different scenarios). 
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Circuit took to answer the questions is representative of the approach the other 
circuits have taken.
102
 
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN STEPHENS
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The case against Henry Stephens began in 2011 when a federal drug 
taskforce suspected he was violating drug and firearms laws.
103
 As part of the 
investigation, on May 13, 2011, a Baltimore police officer installed a GPS 
vehicle tracker underneath Stephens’s car while it was in a public parking 
lot.
104
 The officer, who had been deputized as a federal taskforce officer, did 
not have a search warrant.
105
 Using the information provided by the GPS 
device, officers later located Stephens and his car outside of a nightclub where 
he worked as a security guard.
106
 A search of Stephens’s car led to the 
discovery of a handgun.
107
 Because Stephens had a prior felony conviction, he 
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
108
 
As Stephens awaited trial, the Supreme Court held in Jones that the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker constituted a Fourth 
Amendment “search,” even if the monitoring occurred on public roads.109 
Stephens promptly filed a motion to suppress based on Jones.
110
 The district 
court found that Jones rendered the installation and monitoring of the GPS 
102  See People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1048 (Ill. 2015) (citing cases and reporting that 
“all of the federal circuits that have considered post-Jones whether the good-faith exception 
applies in cases of warrantless GPS searches conducted pre-Jones have rejected a narrow reading 
of Davis and have instead concluded that the good-faith exception applies”). 
103  United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 
1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313). 
104  Id. 
105  Id. It is a common practice for federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), to form taskforces that involve state and local officers 
working in tandem with their federal counterparts. See generally DEA Programs: State & Local 
Task Forces, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.dea.gov/ops/taskforces.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2015). The state and local officers who serve on federal taskforces are deputized and 
given the power to perform the same general duties as full-time federal law enforcement officers. 
Id. 
106  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 330. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. Stephens moved to suppress the location information obtained from the GPS vehicle 
tracker. Id. He also sought suppression of the handgun on the theory that the handgun was a fruit 
of the location information illegally obtained from the GPS vehicle tracker. Id. 
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vehicle tracker on Stephens’s car unconstitutional.111 Nonetheless, the district 
court applied the good-faith exception and refused to suppress the evidence.
112
 
Stephens appealed, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
113
 
B. The Majority Opinion 
The Fourth Circuit majority initially framed the question presented as 
“whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known” that it was 
unconstitutional to install and monitor a GPS tracking device without a 
warrant.
114
 The Court answered that question in the negative and affirmed the 
district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence.115 The majority acknowledged 
that when the officer installed the GPS vehicle tracker on Stephens’s car, there 
was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent specifically holding that 
GPS vehicle trackers could be installed and monitored without a warrant.
116
 
This absence of binding precedent specifically authorizing GPS vehicle 
trackers, Stephens argued, placed the case beyond the scope of Davis’s 
holding.
117
 Under Stephens’s interpretation of Davis, the good-faith exception 
did not apply where an officer relied on “nonbinding precedent, no matter how 
extensive and well-developed that precedent may be.”118 
Although skeptical of Stephens’s narrow interpretation of Davis, the 
Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve whether the good-faith exception 
applies to an officer’s reliance on nonbinding precedent because the court 
concluded that binding precedent, namely the Supreme Court’s decision in 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Judge Shedd authored the majority opinion, which Judge Hamilton joined. Id. at 329. 
Judge Thacker dissented. Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Interestingly, the first paragraph of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion contains a significant 
typographical error. The court began by posing the question: “whether a reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.” Id. The 
court went on to say that “the answer to this question is ‘yes.’ Therefore, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply, and we affirm . . . .” Id. Indeed, if the court’s answer to the question it posed was 
actually “yes,” then the result would have been the application of the exclusionary rule and 
reversal. It is clear, however, from reading the opinion that the answer to the question posed was 
“no,” and the appearance of “yes” in the opinion was a typographical error. 
116  Id. at 332. 
117  Id. at 336–37. 
118  Id. at 337. This, of course, was the question Justice Sotomayor raised in her Davis 
concurrence. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“This case does not present the markedly different question whether the 
exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is 
unsettled.”). 
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Knotts, authorized the officer’s conduct.119 The Stephens majority recognized 
that Knotts dealt with beepers and not GPS devices and was, therefore, not 
identical to the current case.
120
 But the court concluded that the factual 
differences between the two cases were insignificant given Knotts’s broad 
proclamation that “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”121 From the majority’s perspective, Knotts could reasonably have 
been read to cover GPS vehicle trackers.
122
 
Indeed, before Jones, several other courts had specifically held that 
Knotts applied to GPS vehicle trackers.
123
 Included among those courts was the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
124
 That fact was significant to the Fourth 
Circuit majority because the GPS vehicle tracker was installed on Stephens’s 
car in Maryland by a local police officer who happened to also be deputized as 
a federal taskforce officer.
125
 The language of Knotts itself and the general pre-
Jones consensus by courts led the majority to conclude that the good-faith 
exception prevented suppression of the evidence.
126
 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Thacker advanced three primary points in her vigorous dissent. 
First, she argued that Davis was inapplicable because “no ‘binding appellate 
precedent’ existed in this circuit ‘specifically authorizing’ law enforcement’s 
actions.”127 To Judge Thacker, Davis required published precedent from the 
governing circuit court addressing the same legal issue in the same factual 
circumstances. In her opinion, Knotts was not binding appellate precedent 
because it did not involve the unauthorized physical attachment of a GPS 
device to a suspect’s property.128 Additionally, Judge Thacker was concerned 
about the significant technological differences between the beeper in Knotts 
119  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 337. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
122  Id. at 333. 
123  Id. (citing cases). 
124  Id. at 334 (citing Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)). 
125  See id. at 338 (“[W]e would make a mockery of the good-faith inquiry if we were to 
ignore the clear pre-Jones state of the law in Maryland—as pronounced by Maryland’s highest 
court—and hold that a Maryland officer’s use of the GPS was objectively unreasonable.”). 
126  Id. at 338–39. 
127  Id. at 342 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429, 
2434 (2011)). 
128  Id. 
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and the GPS device installed on Stephens’s car.129 Other judges have shared 
Judge Thacker’s belief that GPS technology is fundamentally different from the 
antiquated beepers of days gone by.
130
 As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the 
Ninth Circuit explained, GPS vehicle trackers “have little in common with the 
primitive [beeper] devices in Knotts . . . . Beepers could help police keep 
vehicles in view when following them, or find them when they lost sight of 
them, but they still required at least one officer—and usually many more—to 
follow the suspect.”131 Conversely, GPS vehicle trackers “can record the car’s 
movements without human intervention—quietly, invisibly, with uncanny 
precision.”132 
Second, Judge Thacker criticized the majority for treating Davis as 
though it allowed officers to rely on a generalized “vast majority of decisions” 
from other jurisdictions instead of binding appellate precedent from the 
governing circuit.
133
 By her reading of Davis, mere reliance on “widely 
accepted legal norms is not the standard, nor should it be.”134 Thus, it did not 
matter to Judge Thacker what other courts had held. The only thing that 
mattered was the absence of any Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent 
directly on-point.
135
 
Third, Judge Thacker argued that the deterrence rationale would have 
been served by applying the exclusionary rule. She emphasized that the 
officer’s conduct occurred after the D.C. Circuit had ruled it unconstitutional to 
install and monitor GPS vehicle trackers without a warrant; thus, she asserted 
that the law in the other circuits was unclear at the time the GPS device was 
129  Id. at 342 & n.4. 
130  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Greenaway, J., 
dissenting) (“GPS technology is vastly different from the more primitive tracking devices of 
yesteryear—‘beepers.’”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); see also United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (“The electronic tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common 
with the primitive devices in Knotts.”). 
131  Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124. 
132  Id.; see State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 347 n.5 (S.C. 2014) (noting that “beepers serve as 
aids to law enforcement already conducting physical surveillance, while a GPS enables officers 
to take a passive role and simply monitor location data from a computer”). 
133  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 344 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
134  Id. 
135  Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina (located within the Fourth Circuit) 
agreed with Judge Thacker’s position and refused to apply the good-faith exception to the pre-
Jones installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker. See Adams, 763 S.E.2d at 347. 
According to the Adams court, neither Knotts nor Karo “expressly or impliedly authorized” the 
installation of a GPS device. Id. And, the court further concluded that “no pre-Jones precedent in 
this federal circuit extended Knotts or Karo to the installation and monitoring of a GPS device.” 
Id. 
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installed.
136
 In such a circumstance, Judge Thacker believed officers should be 
encouraged (via the exclusionary rule) to “err on the side of the Constitution 
and obtain a warrant.”137 At least one Supreme Court Justice would share Judge 
Thacker’s position—Justice Sotomayor made clear in her Davis concurrence 
that the good-faith exception should not apply when the law in a particular area 
is in flux.
138
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE “KNOTTS IS BINDING PRECEDENT UNDER DAVIS”
APPROACH 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stephens is undoubtedly important for 
what it held—that Knotts constitutes binding appellate precedent under Davis. 
But it is perhaps even more important for what it almost (and should have) 
held. Reading the Stephens majority opinion is a bit like watching a movie 
where you think you know what is going to happen next, but then all of a 
sudden there is an unforeseen plot twist. And not just an unforeseen twist, but a 
twist that is inconsistent with events that previously occurred. 
At the beginning of its legal analysis, the majority stated that neither 
the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit had “expressly approved or 
disapproved of warrantless GPS usage in 2011.”139 Stephens’s argument, of 
course, was that the absence of such express approval placed the case outside 
136  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 345 (Thacker, J., dissenting). Judge Thacker was referring to the 
D.C. Circuit’s 2010 decision in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In 
Maynard (which became entitled United States v. Jones when it reached the Supreme Court), the 
D.C. Circuit had concluded that the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle 
trackers constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 555–56. The D.C. Circuit reached that 
conclusion by employing a theory known as the “mosaic theory”—meaning what may appear 
trivial to the uninformed may be greatly important to individuals with a broader view. See id. at 
562; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
311, 313 (2012) (stating that Maynard was based on “a ‘mosaic theory’ of the Fourth 
Amendment” and explaining how theory was applied by the D.C. Circuit). The Supreme Court in 
Jones reached the same result as the D.C. Circuit in Maynard (i.e., treating the installation and 
monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker as a “search”), but Jones did not adopt the mosaic theory. 
See Kerr, supra, at 326 (“Having resolved the case on trespass grounds, Justice Scalia [writing 
for the majority] did not need to reach the mosaic theory adopted in the D.C. Circuit.”). Id. 
137  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 346 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
138  See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“This case does not present the markedly different question whether the exclusionary rule 
applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled.”). Other 
circuit court judges have expressed the same sentiment as Judge Thacker. See, e.g., United States 
v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 192 (3d Cir. 2014) (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (“Where an officer
decides to take the Fourth Amendment inquiry into his own hands, rather than to seek a warrant 
from a neutral magistrate—particularly where the law is as far from settled as it was here—he 
acts in a constitutionally reckless fashion.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015). 
139  Stephens, 764 F.3d at 332 (majority opinion). 
2015] THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION AFTER DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 663 
the scope of Davis’s holding.140 The majority appeared poised to hold that the 
good-faith exception applied even in the absence of binding precedent.
141
 
Indeed, the court expressed its skepticism of the defendant’s “narrow view of 
the good-faith inquiry,”142 and it noted that accepting the narrow view would 
mean an officer could not rely on “universal, but non-binding, precedent that 
was directly on point.”143 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the good-faith 
exception “is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed by the 
Supreme Court.”144 The scene had been set for the court to take the next step 
and hold that even though there was no binding appellate precedent in the 
Fourth Circuit, a reasonable officer would not have known it was illegal to 
install and monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways. Then, out of 
nowhere, the Stephens court punted on that “interesting issue” and held instead 
that the case fit neatly within the scope of Davis because Knotts was binding 
appellate precedent that specifically authorized the officer’s conduct.145 
The Fourth Circuit has company at the table for its view of the 
interplay between Knotts and Davis. The First, Second, Third, and Seventh 
Circuits
146—along with several state courts147—have reached the same result. 
140  Id. at 336–37. 
141  Id. at 337. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 337 n.11. 
144  Id. at 336. 
145  Id. at 337. 
146  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2013) (treating Knotts as binding appellate court
precedent for purposes of Davis); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(determining that Knotts and a prior First Circuit case applying Knotts were “sufficiently clear 
and apposite to trigger Davis”). Several other circuits have applied Davis based on the existence 
of their own circuit precedent regarding precursor technologies to GPS devices. See United States 
v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 835 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that prior circuit decision authorizing the
warrantless monitoring of beepers was binding appellate court precedent under Davis for 
purposes of warrantless GPS monitoring); see also United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 204 
(6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prior circuit decision involving cell-site location information 
constituted binding precedent authorizing warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle 
trackers); United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2013). 
147  See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205, 215–16 (Md. 2013) (“We therefore hold that, before 
Jones, binding appellate precedent in Maryland, namely Knotts, authorized the GPS tracking of a 
vehicle on public roads.”); State v. Johnson, 22 N.E.3d 1061, 1062 (Ohio 2014) (holding that 
“Knotts and Karo served as binding appellate precedent to justify placing GPS tracking devices 
on suspects’ vehicles without obtaining a search warrant”). Notably, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina has issued a decision that squarely contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stephens. 
See State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 347 (S.C. 2014). The Adams court suppressed the evidence 
obtained from a GPS vehicle tracker and refused to apply the good-faith exception because there 
was no binding appellate precedent “in this federal circuit” authorizing warrantless installation 
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Although those courts and the Stephens court reached the right result (i.e., 
refusal to apply the exclusionary rule), they made a misstep by trying to cram 
the square peg that is Knotts into Davis’s round hole. There was a much cleaner 
way of reaching the same result. The Stephens court should have done what it 
initially seemed poised to do—hold that at the time the GPS vehicle tracker 
was installed and monitored no “reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that the [conduct] was illegal.”148 Instead, the Fourth Circuit (and those 
courts that have taken the same approach) has distorted Knotts and stretched 
Davis to create binding appellate precedent where none existed. As explained 
below in Part III.A, Knotts does not constitute binding appellate precedent 
under Davis. And Part III.B argues that instead of distorting existing case law 
to reach a desired result, the courts should have resolved the exclusionary rule 
question by applying the general good-faith analysis. 
A. Knotts Does Not Constitute Binding Appellate Precedent 
In the pre-Jones era, Knotts could have reasonably been read to suggest 
that a warrant was not needed to install and subsequently monitor a GPS 
vehicle tracker on public roadways.
149
 A suggestion, however, is not what 
Davis requires. Rather, Davis is a narrow opinion that was intended to address 
the very distinct situation of an officer engaging in conduct that was 
“specifically authorize[d]” by “binding precedent that [was] later overruled.”150 
Given that the words “specifically authorized” and “binding” appear 
throughout the Davis opinion,
151
 it is easy to conclude that the Court was 
serious about its opinion only applying where there was prior “binding 
precedent” that “specifically authorized” the challenged police conduct. 
To put it in terms familiar to any law student, Davis only applies when 
the prior precedent was a published opinion from the governing circuit court (or 
and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers. Id. According to the court, “Knotts and Karo did not 
constitute binding precedent” because neither case “expressly or impliedly authorized, a physical 
trespass as occurred in this case.” Id. 
148  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). 
149  See generally Fisher, 745 F.3d at 204 (stating that Knotts and Karo, when read together, 
“strongly suggested” but did not go so far as to specifically authorize the warrantless installation 
and monitoring of GPS devices). 
150  See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423, 2429 (2011); see also People v. 
LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1070, 1074 (Ill. 2015) (Burke, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Davis 
recognized a narrow exception” that applies only when “there exists binding precedent within the 
particular jurisdiction governing the law enforcement officials”); State v. Hohn, 321 P.3d 799 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished table decision) (explaining that adopting the prosecution’s 
interpretation of Davis “would be to extend the definition of binding precedent way beyond its 
original boundaries”); Mason, supra note 4, at 69–72 (arguing that Davis is a narrow opinion that 
does not apply unless there is binding precedent that “expressly authorized the search”). 
151  See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24, 2428–29. 
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the Supreme Court) that is “on all fours” with the current case. Returning to the 
example case of Stephens, there was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit 
precedent specifically authorizing the warrantless installation and monitoring of 
GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones. Rather than acknowledging the absence of 
binding precedent and deciding the case without reliance on Davis, the Fourth 
Circuit and many of its sister circuits have mistakenly chosen to pretend that 
Knotts was binding precedent that specifically authorized the warrantless 
installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
152
 
A close reading of Knotts, however, shows that the Court’s decision 
only addressed the act of monitoring a vehicle’s location using a tracking 
device. It said nothing about the installation of a tracking device on an 
individual’s vehicle.153 In the second beeper case, Karo, the Court briefly 
addressed whether installing the beeper in a container implicated the Fourth 
Amendment.
154
 The Karo Court concluded that the installation of the beeper 
(with permission from the owner of the container where the beeper was placed) 
was insufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment.
155
 Thus, to arrive at the 
conclusion that the installation and monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker was not 
a search prior to Jones, one would have to read Knotts and Karo, extrapolate 
general principles from them, combine those general principles together, and 
then apply those general principles to GPS vehicle trackers through analogical 
reasoning.
156
 That is a far cry from Davis, where there was a binding appellate 
court decision holding “X is constitutional” and an officer performed “X.” 
152  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 337 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating that 
the officer’s “use of the GPS was objectively reasonable because of the binding appellate 
precedent of Knotts”), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313); United 
States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 65 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (determining that Knotts and a prior First Circuit case applying Knotts were 
“sufficiently clear and apposite to trigger Davis”); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261–62 
(2d Cir. 2013) (treating Knotts as binding appellate court precedent for purposes of Davis). 
153  See Mason, supra note 4, at 78 (recognizing that neither Knotts nor Karo “expressly 
authorize the non-consensual installation of a tracker”). 
154  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984). The Court viewed the installation 
of the beeper as a “technical trespass” that “was only marginally relevant to the question of 
whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.” Id. According to the Karo Court, a physical 
trespass was “neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 713. 
155  See id. (concluding “that no Fourth Amendment interest of Karo or of any other 
respondent was infringed by the installation of the beeper”). 
156  See Mason, supra note 4, at 78 (explaining that “Davis is about express authorization 
(rather than the possibility of creative analogizing)”); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 188 
(Greenaway, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for holding that “two disparate Supreme 
Court precedents [Knotts and Karo]” can be read together to constitute binding appellate 
precedent for purposes of Davis). 
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Additionally, beepers and GPS devices (while sharing some 
similarities) are not synonymous.
157
 A beeper “is a radio transmitter, usually 
battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio 
receiver.”158 Beepers require active involvement by a police officer on the street 
because they only work if an officer with a radio receiver is physically close 
enough to the beeper to pick up the signal it emits.
159
 Beepers also lack the 
ability to provide location information with pinpoint precision.
160
 GPS devices, 
on the other hand, are much more precise, require fewer resources, and store 
significantly more data.
161
 Indeed, some modern GPS devices can determine 
location “with accuracy to within ten inches.”162 And, GPS devices can store 
“8,000 to 17,000 data points” per day163 all with very little active involvement 
required on the part of law enforcement officers.
164
 
To be blunt, treating a case about beepers as though it was binding 
precedent in a case about GPS devices is akin to treating a case about horses as 
157  See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 342 n.4 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (noting that a beeper and a GPS 
device “are of an entirely different character. A beeper . . . requires law enforcement to at least be 
in proximity to the device to receive the transmitted signal, whereas a GPS device downloads 
location data at specific time intervals with no proximity needed.”); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 
193 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (“GPS technology is vastly different from the more primitive 
tracking devices of yesteryear—‘beepers.’”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The electronic 
tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common with the primitive devices 
in Knotts.”). 
158  Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post-United States v. Jones 
Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 553, 557 (2015). 
159  Id. at 558 (explaining that the “beeper’s reliability and range vary, with a typical ground-
to-ground signal in an uninhabited area of two to four miles,” and in more urban areas with an 
increased likelihood of interference, “the receiver’s efficacy may be limited to an area within a 
two-block radius of the beeper”). 
160  Id. (“Beeper devices lack the capacity to triangulate an individual’s location with pinpoint 
accuracy, instead only offering more generalized locational data.”). 
161  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(discussing the capabilities of GPS technology); see also Courtney Elgart, Note, The Road from 
Jones: The Requirement of Reasonableness for a GPS Search of a Vehicle, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
631, 643 (2015) (“GPS uses satellites to determine the location of a receiver, including latitude, 
longitude, altitude, speed, and direction. A GPS device can calculate its location to within a few 
centimeters and usually recalculates its location over five to ten second intervals.”). 
162  See Miller, supra note 158, at 561. 
163  Elgart, supra note 161, at 631 (“A Global Positioning System (‘GPS’) device records its 
location every five to ten seconds. Over the course of one day, a GPS device could produce 
approximately 8,000 to 17,000 data points. Those data points include the device’s latitude, 
longitude, altitude, and a time stamp.”). 
164  See Miller, supra note 158, at 561–62 (explaining that GPS devices provide “the 
secondary advantage of allowing law enforcement to not allocate personnel to constant round-
the-clock monitoring while allowing them to gain the same information on the movements of the 
individual/object tracked”). 
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binding precedent in a case about automobiles. There are similarities between 
the two technologies and they accomplish the same general goal, but they are 
not the same. Such a situation stands in stark contrast to what happened in 
Davis. The officer in Davis searched a car incident to the lawful arrest of a 
recent occupant, and he followed “to the letter” an Eleventh Circuit decision 
involving a virtually identical fact pattern.
165
 The fact patterns were the same, 
and the legal questions were identical.
166
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court declared in 
Jones that neither Knotts nor Karo authorized the warrantless installation and 
monitoring of GPS vehicle trackers.
167
 According to the Court, the Jones 
decision is “perfectly consistent” with Knotts and Karo because those cases did 
not involve the trespassory installation of a tracking device without the consent 
of the owner.
168
 Thus, the Court’s decision in Jones left both Knotts and Karo 
intact. Put another way, the Supreme Court has made clear that neither Knotts 
nor Karo authorized officers to install and monitor GPS vehicle trackers 
without a warrant. It is, therefore, virtually beyond the realm of possibility to 
believe that the Supreme Court would view Knotts as “binding appellate 
precedent [that] specifically authorize[d]”169 the installation and monitoring of 
GPS vehicle trackers. 
Clearly, the circuit courts—like the Stephens court—that have adopted 
the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach” have done so because 
they cringed at the thought of “set[ting] the criminal loose in the community 
without punishment”170 because a well-meaning officer failed to predict the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. Their reluctance to apply the exclusionary 
rule in such a situation is understandable.
171
 But, their approach—squeezing 
Knotts to fit within Davis—is analytically indefensible and difficult to 
comprehend. It is made all the more difficult to comprehend by the fact that the 
165  See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). 
166  Id. (explaining that the search of Davis’s car incident to his arrest followed then-existing 
Eleventh Circuit precedent “to the letter”). 
167  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2012). 
168  See id. at 952 (explaining that Knotts did not involve a challenge to the installation of the 
beeper and Karo addressed the “specific question” of whether installation of the device “with the 
consent of the original owner” of the container where the beeper was placed implicated the 
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 343 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(Thacker, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Jones . . . of its own beeper 
cases forecloses the possibility that these cases support the warrantless GPS search in the case at 
hand.”), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-1313); State v. Mitchell, 
323 P.3d 69, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 
169  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429. 
170  See id. at 2427. 
171  See id. (explaining the downsides of applying the exclusionary rule). 
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court in Stephens and its sister circuits could have taken another, much less 
rocky, path to the same result. 
B. A Better Path Leading to the Same Result 
The decisions of those courts that have adopted the “Knotts is binding 
precedent under Davis approach” would have been more analytically sound 
(but no less controversial) had they resolved the exclusionary rule issue without 
relying on Davis. Generally speaking, to determine whether the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies, courts must determine “whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in 
light of all the circumstances.”172 If the answer is “no,” then the exclusionary 
rule is inapplicable. The good-faith inquiry is reflective of the Supreme Court’s 
current view of the exclusionary rule as the nuclear option that only applies 
when there is “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence” by the police.173 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis is only one example of a 
circumstance where an officer would not have known his conduct was 
illegal.
174
 But other circumstances exist—circumstances not quite as clear as 
those presented in Davis—where the good-faith exception also should apply. 
As the Third Circuit has explained, “[e]ven where Davis does not control, it is 
our duty to consider the totality of the circumstances to answer the ‘objectively 
ascertainable question’ of whether a reasonable police officer would have 
known the search was illegal.”175 Rather than devoting so much energy to 
unconvincingly explaining why Knotts was binding appellate precedent, the 
circuit courts should have simply answered the general good-faith question of 
whether on May 31, 2011, a reasonable officer would have known it was 
unlawful to install and monitor a GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways 
without a warrant. Considering the legal landscape prior to Jones, there is a 
strong argument that the question should have been answered “no.”176 
172  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). 
173  Id. at 144. 
174  See People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1050 (Ill. 2015) (explaining that “application of 
the good-faith inquiry is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Davis”). 
175  United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07, 922 n.23 (1984)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); see also
LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d at 1057 (agreeing with Katzin that even if Knotts was not binding precedent 
under Davis the exclusionary rule would be inapplicable under the “Supreme Court’s general 
good-faith analysis” because the officer “in relying on the legal landscape that existed at the time 
the search was conducted” did not act unreasonably or with the required level of culpability). 
176  See generally United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (“One can doubt 
that much deterrence is to be had from telling the police that they are not entitled to rely on 
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Looking specifically at the facts of Stephens, it should be remembered 
that when the officer (a local Maryland police officer working on a federal 
taskforce) installed the GPS vehicle tracker on Stephens’s car, there was 
Maryland state court precedent authorizing his conduct.
177
 Moreover, from the 
officer’s past experience with GPS vehicle trackers, he had no reason to believe 
a warrant was required.
178
 In fact, as the district court judge remarked, if the 
officer had sought a warrant the magistrate judge likely would have said “you 
don’t need a warrant for that.”179 The United States Department of Justice 
shared the same view.
180
 So too did the Fourth Circuit’s sister circuits (save 
one) who had addressed the issue of GPS vehicle trackers prior to Jones.
181
 
And while out-of-circuit decisions are not binding, it is commonplace and 
certainly not unreasonable for officers—like lawyers and judges—to rely on 
out-of-circuit precedent when the governing circuit has yet to confront a 
particular problem.
182
 Expecting more of police officers than of Article III 
judges, state court judges, and federal prosecutors is fundamentally unfair.
183
 
decisions issued by several circuits, just because the circuit covering the state in which an 
investigation is ongoing lacks its own precedent.”). 
177  See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing case law from the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals), cert. denied, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 
14-1313). The question of whether a state court precedent qualifies as binding appellate 
precedent for a state police officer who is working on a federal investigation is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Professor Caleb Mason, however, has written an article that discusses that issue 
and many others. See Mason, supra note 4, at 72–78. 
178  See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 331 (describing the officer’s experience with GPS vehicle 
trackers and his understanding of the law at the time the device was installed on Stephens’s car). 
179  See id. 
180  See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 181 (“[I]t was DOJ policy at the time that a warrant was not 
required to install a battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a public street and to surveil it 
on public roads.”). 
181  See id. at 180 (stating that prior to Jones there “was a nearly uniform consensus across the 
federal courts of appeals that addressed the issue that the installation and subsequent use of a 
GPS or GPS-like device was not a search, or, at most, was a search but did not require a 
warrant. . . . The lone dissenting voice was United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).”). 
182  See United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (“One can doubt that much 
deterrence is to be had from telling the police that they are not entitled to rely on decisions issued 
by several circuits, just because the circuit covering the state in which an investigation is ongoing 
lacks its own precedent.”). 
183  Interestingly, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion recognized the difficulty of saying that 
an officer who relies in good faith on non-binding precedent (in the absence of binding 
precedent) is any more culpable than an officer who relies in good faith on binding precedent. 
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But an officer 
who conducts a search that he believes complies with the Constitution but which, it ultimately 
turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s bounds is no more culpable than an officer 
who follows erroneous ‘binding precedent.’ Nor is an officer more culpable where circuit 
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If the Supreme Court means what it has said, then the exclusionary rule 
only applies when officers have violated a defendant’s rights deliberately, 
recklessly, or through gross or systemic negligence.
184
 None of those labels fit 
the conduct of officers like the officer in Stephens who reasonably believed that 
he was acting lawfully. Thus, the circuit courts should have refused to apply the 
exclusionary rule in cases like Stephens because no “reasonably well trained 
officer would have known that . . . [it] was illegal”185 to install and monitor a 
GPS vehicle tracker on public roadways before Jones. After all, how could an 
officer be viewed as violating a defendant’s rights deliberately, recklessly, or 
through gross negligence when the officer’s actions were consistent with (1) 
the vast majority of persuasive federal precedent,
186
 (2) precedent from 
numerous state courts,
187
 and (3) the legal advice espoused by the highly-
trained lawyers at the United States Department of Justice?
188
 
Instead of taking that straightforward approach, there is now circuit 
precedent nationwide standing for the proposition that “binding appellate 
precedent” actually means “persuasive precedent” and “specifically 
authorizing” actually means “suggesting.” Aside from contradicting the express 
language of Davis’s holding, this approach obscures the true nature of the 
modern exclusionary rule inquiry. By going to such lengths to fit GPS vehicle 
trackers within the holding of Knotts, the circuit courts in decisions like 
Stephens have made it (incorrectly) appear that Davis is itself a separate 
exception rather than one example of a circumstance where a reasonably well 
trained police officer would not have known his or her conduct was illegal.
189
 
precedent is simply suggestive rather than ‘binding,’ where it only describes how to treat roughly 
analogous instances, or where it just does not exist.”). 
184  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (stating that “when police 
mistakes are the result of negligence . . . , rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of 
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’ In such a case, the 
criminal should not go free because the constable has blundered.” (quoting United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984))). 
185  Id. at 145. 
186  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 781 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2015); Brown, 744 F.3d at 
474; United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 
(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 
251 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012). 
187  See, e.g., Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008), abrogated by Kelly v. 
State, 56 A.2d 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
188  See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 181 (reporting that prior to Jones, the Department of Justice policy 
was “that a warrant was not required to install a battery-powered GPS on a vehicle parked on a 
public street and to surveil it on public roads”). 
189  The Third Circuit primarily held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo 
“were binding appellate precedent upon which the agents could reasonably have relied under 
Davis.” Id. at 173. The court, however, did conclude “[i]n the alternative we conclude that, under 
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As explained in the next Part of this Article, the scope of Davis and its place in 
the overall exclusionary rule scheme is an issue that will continue to face the 
courts. 
V. THE NEXT WAVE OF LITIGATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF DAVIS’S 
HOLDING 
Over two years have passed since Jones declared the installation and 
monitoring of a GPS vehicle tracker to be a Fourth Amendment “search.” As 
discussed in the preceding sections, those two years have been filled with 
litigation over the fate of evidence gathered from GPS vehicle trackers installed 
and monitored pre-Jones. Given that most circuit courts have now addressed 
that question, new cases raising that precise issue will be few. But, Stephens 
and the other cases that have endorsed the “Knotts is binding precedent under 
Davis approach” will remain important. That is so because the question of 
Davis’s meaning—and the broader question about the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in cases where new technology leads to the upheaval of 
settled Fourth Amendment expectations—is not going away. Indeed, the next 
wave of litigation raising those issues has already formed. 
That wave of litigation involves the Supreme Court’s recent landmark 
decision in Riley v. California.
190
 At issue in Riley was the applicability of the 
search incident to lawful arrest doctrine to cell phones found on a person who 
had been arrested.
191
 Under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine that 
was first announced in Chimel v. California,
192
 officers who have made a 
lawful arrest may, without a warrant, search the arrestee’s person and the area 
within the arrestee’s immediate control.193 In a series of cases following 
Chimel, the Court held that the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine also 
authorizes the police to search containers
194
 and other items of “personal 
the Supreme Court’s more general good faith test, the evidence should not be suppressed because 
the agents acted with a good faith belief in the lawfulness of their conduct that was objectively 
reasonable.” Id.; see also People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1057 (Ill. 2015) (following the 
approach taken by the Third Circuit in Katzin). The Third Circuit’s alternative holding is the 
approach this Article argues should have been the primary approach taken by all of the circuits. 
190  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
191  See id. (stating the question presented as “whether the police may, without a warrant, 
search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested”). 
192  395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 
(2011). 
193  See id. at 763 (“There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person 
and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within 
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”). 
194  See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that the search incident 
to lawful arrest doctrine authorized a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a cigarette 
pack that was found on the defendant’s person after his arrest). 
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property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”195 Thus, 
prior to Riley, the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine provided officers 
with near carte blanche authority to search every item found on an arrestee’s 
person or within the arrestee’s grabbing area, so long as the search was 
contemporaneous with the arrest.
196
 
As the prevalence of cell phones increased, police officers were 
frequently finding them on arrestees.
197
 And, that raised the following question 
in courts nationwide: Is a warrant required to search the contents of the cell 
phone, or may the police conduct such a search under the search incident to 
lawful arrest doctrine?
198
 The lower courts were divided on the answer, but the 
majority view was that the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine authorized 
warrantless searches of cell phones found on an arrestee’s person at the time of 
arrest.
199
 Those courts generally viewed cell phones as containers—and there 
was a bright-line rule that containers found on the person of an arrestee were 
subject to search under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine.
200
 
195  See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (holding that the search incident to 
lawful arrest doctrine did not authorize a warrantless search of a 200-pound footlocker that was 
in the defendant’s trunk when he was arrested), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1991). 
196  See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident 
to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381 (2001) (stating that the search incident to lawful 
arrest doctrine “affords police an unqualified right to search anyone they arrest, without first 
obtaining a search warrant from a neutral judicial official”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, The 
iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 30–31 (2008) (stating that “the 
search incident to [lawful] arrest doctrine has functioned as a bright-line rule—allowing police to 
search the entire person of an arrestee without getting into sticky questions of whether there was 
probable cause to open a particular container”). 
197  See Gershowitz, supra note 196, at 29 (discussing the prevalence of cell phones in 
American society); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (stating that cell 
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from 
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy”). 
198  See Margaret M. Lawton, Warrantless Searches and Smartphones: Privacy in the Palm of 
Your Hand?, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 89, 89 (2012) (explaining that the question of whether cell 
phones may be searched incident to lawful arrest was one facing courts across the country). 
199  See United States v. Trapp, No. 1:13-cr-62, 2014 WL 1117012, at *12 (D. Vt. Mar. 20, 
2014) (stating that “at the time of the search, ‘all of the circuits to address the issue had 
permitted’ cell phone searches incident to arrest” (quoting United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-CR-
48, 2013 WL 5945802, at *15 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013))); see also Gracie v. State, 92 So. 3d 806, 
812 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (“We agree with the majority of jurisdictions surveyed that a 
warrantless search of a defendant’s cellular telephone following his arrest does not violate Fourth 
Amendment principles . . . .”); Lawton, supra note 198, at 89 (explaining that “the vast majority 
of courts, both state and federal, to have considered the issue have allowed warrantless searches 
of cell phones”). 
200  See Lawton, supra note 198, at 104–05 (“Most courts, both federal and state, that have 
considered searches of cell phones incident to arrest have treated those devices as containers, 
drawing analogies between cell phones and address books, or pagers, for example.”); see also 
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That bright-line rule became much dimmer on June 25, 2014, when the 
Court issued its decision in Riley. The Riley Court narrowed the scope of the 
search incident to lawful arrest doctrine by holding that, absent exigent 
circumstances, officers must have a warrant to “search digital information on a 
cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”201 Due largely to 
their “immense storage capacity,” the Court distinguished cell phones from 
other containers that cannot store nearly as much private information.
202
 
The issue now being litigated in the lower courts is whether the 
exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained via warrantless searches of cell 
phones conducted incident to lawful arrest before Riley.
203
 Building on its 
success in having the lower courts refuse to exclude evidence obtained from 
GPS vehicle trackers installed and monitored pre-Jones, the government has 
been pushing the courts to apply Davis to the pre-Riley cell phone search 
cases.
204
 Thus, to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies to pre-Riley 
Gershowitz, supra note 196, at 31 (“Thus, if we think of an iPhone as a container—like a 
cigarette package or a closed box—police can open and search the contents inside with no 
questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as they are doing so pursuant to a valid 
arrest.”). 
201  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477. 
202  See id. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other 
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. . . . Before cell phones, a search of a person 
was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow 
intrusion of privacy.”). 
203  See, e.g., United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Davis and 
affirming denial of motion to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone search conducted 
without a warrant before Riley); United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1135–36 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2014) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to a pre-Riley search of a cell phone even 
though there was no Sixth Circuit precedent specifically authorizing the search, and reading 
Davis broadly to encompass the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson which upheld the search 
incident to lawful arrest of a container found on the defendant’s person); United States v. 
Jenkins, No. 3:13-cr-30125-DRH-11, 2014 WL 4470609, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2014) 
(applying Davis and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to a pre-Riley cell phone search, even 
though there was no Seventh Circuit precedent specifically authorizing cell phone searches 
incident to a lawful arrest); Spence v. State, 118 A.3d 864, 867–68 (Md. Ct. App. 2015) 
(applying Davis and concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson constituted 
binding precedent on the issue of cell phone searches prior to Riley); Trapp, 2014 WL 1117012, 
at *12 (citing Davis and concluding that the good-faith exception to a pre-Riley search of a cell 
phone incident to lawful arrest). But see United States v. Eisenhour, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1032 
(D. Nev. 2014) (refusing to apply the good-faith exception to a pre-Riley cell phone search 
because there was no “binding appellate precedent in this case for the police to rely upon. No 
Ninth Circuit case explicitly rules that digital data on a cell phone can be searched incident to 
arrest.”). 
204  See, e.g., Clark, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 1145 (“The government contends the exclusionary rule 
should not apply here because Officer Narramore engaged in a limited search of the smartphone 
at the scene of arrest and during the interview under a good faith assumption that no warrant was 
necessary.”). 
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searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest, the courts are plowing the 
same ground they plowed in the post-Jones GPS vehicle tracker cases. 
Three circuits had explicitly held in pre-Riley published opinions that 
warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest were authorized by the 
Fourth Amendment.
205
 In those circuits, Davis clearly applies because the 
officers were relying on “binding precedent that [was] later overruled.”206 And, 
one circuit—the First Circuit—had explicitly held pre-Riley that cell phones 
could not be searched incident to lawful arrest without a warrant.
207
 It cannot be 
disputed, therefore, that Davis does not save the evidence obtained from pre-
Riley cell phone searches in the First Circuit. But, what about the circuits that 
had not specifically addressed searching cell phones incident to lawful arrest 
before Riley? 
Those circuits will be in the same position the Fourth Circuit and many 
of its sister circuits were in with regard to evidence obtained from GPS vehicle 
trackers that were installed and monitored before Jones. Relying on the broad 
reading of Davis embodied by the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis 
approach,” the government is, unsurprisingly, advancing the argument that the 
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in United States v. Robinson,208 regarding the 
search of a cigarette pack, constituted binding precedent specifically 
authorizing the search of a cell phone incident to lawful arrest before Riley.
209
 
As the argument goes, prior to Riley the lower courts had generally viewed 
Robinson as standing for the proposition that the police may search incident to 
lawful arrest any container found on the arrestee’s person.210 A cell phone is a 
205  See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit had upheld a search incident to 
lawful arrest of a cell phone before Riley, but the court suggested that its opinion was limited to 
authorizing a search of a cell phone to obtain the phone’s number. See United States v. Flores-
Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2012) (providing a detailed analysis of the search incident 
to lawful arrest doctrine in the context of cell phones, but leaving the questions about searching 
the contents of a cell phone for “another day, since the police [in this case] did not search the 
contents of the defendant’s cell phone, but were content to obtain the cell phone’s phone 
number”). The Eleventh Circuit had issued an unpublished decision upholding the search of a 
cell phone incident to lawful arrest. See United States v. Fuentes, 368 F. App’x 95, 99 (11th Cir. 
2010). The issue of whether unpublished decisions qualify as “binding precedent” under Davis is 
an interesting question that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
206  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011). 
207  See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
208  414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
209  See United States v. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that “the Court should refuse to suppress the cellphone search because 
the officers searched Defendant’s cellphone in reliance on the Supreme Court’s 1973 holding that 
officers may open a cigarette package found on a suspect’s person incident to his arrest”). 
210  See generally Lawton, supra note 198, at 104–05 (pointing out—pre-Riley—that “[m]ost 
courts . . . that have considered searches of cell phones incident to arrest have treated these 
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modern-day container. Therefore, Robinson authorized the search incident to 
lawful arrest of cell phones. So far, the government’s argument has gained 
some traction with one circuit court and several district courts finding it 
persuasive.
211
 
As the issue continues to work its way through the system, courts 
without any pre-Riley precedent directly addressing searches of cell phones 
incident to lawful arrest should resist the temptation to employ the reasoning 
that led to the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis approach.” In other 
words, the courts should refuse to identify a case (i.e., Robinson) from over 
forty years ago that shares some basic similarities with the searching of cell 
phones and pretend that it qualifies under Davis as binding precedent that 
specifically authorized police officers to search a cell phone—a device that was 
little more than a pipe dream at the time Robinson was decided. Instead, the 
courts should simply conduct the general good-faith inquiry by asking and 
answering the following question: At the time of the search, would a 
reasonably well trained police officer have known that it was illegal to search a 
cell phone incident to lawful arrest? The answer to that question may not be 
easy, but at least it is the right question to ask. Should the courts choose, 
however, to adopt the same broad reading of Davis that led to the “Knotts is 
binding precedent under Davis approach,” the result will be a continued and 
unwarranted distortion of Davis’s narrow holding.212 
devices as containers, drawing analogies between cell phones and address books, or pagers”); see 
also Gershowitz, supra note 196, at 31 (stating pre-Riley that “if we think of an iPhone as a 
container—like a cigarette pack or a closed box—police can open and search the contents inside 
with no questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as they are doing so pursuant to 
a valid arrest”). 
211  See, e.g., United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 705, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2015) (treating 
Robinson and prior circuit court precedent in analogous cases as binding appellate precedent 
authorizing the search incident to lawful arrest of a cell phone prior to Riley); United States v. 
Clark, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (concluding that the “Supreme Court 
authority regarding searches of other types of containers found on an arrestee’s person, such as 
Robinson and its progeny, in combination with the decisions of all circuit courts to have 
addressed the issue of a cell phone search incident to arrest at the time of the searches of 
Defendant’s smartphone, render the actions of [the officer] objectively reasonable under the 
reasoning of Davis”); see also United States v. Caldwell, No. 1:13-cr-128, 2015 WL 179583, at 
*12 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2015).
212  See generally People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 1043, 1070–71 (Ill. 2015) (Burke, J., 
dissenting) (opining that the broad “legal landscape” interpretation of Davis endorsed by many 
courts is “directly at odds with Davis” itself which “recognized a narrow exception” that “was 
limited to jurisdictions which clearly authorized the officer’s conduct . . . . There are no 
references in Davis to ‘generally accepted authority,’ ‘legal landscape,’ or persuasive or well-
reasoned precedent.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis was intended to be a narrow 
one that, by its terms, only applies when “binding appellate precedent 
specifically authorize[d] a particular police practice” that was later deemed 
unconstitutional.
213
 When confronted with a situation where a widespread 
police practice—the warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS vehicle 
trackers—was declared unconstitutional by the Court in Jones, the lower courts 
were forced to determine whether the exclusionary rule applied to evidence 
obtained from those GPS vehicle trackers. A majority of the circuit courts 
resolved that issue by applying the “Knotts is binding precedent under Davis 
approach.” That approach required bending, twisting, and distorting Davis to 
apply in a situation where there was not actually any binding precedent that 
specifically authorized the officer’s conduct. The courts could have (and should 
have) reached the same end result by applying the general good-faith analysis. 
Here’s hoping that in future cases, like those involving pre-Riley searches of 
cell phones incident to lawful arrest, the courts will resolve the exclusionary 
rule issue without further muddying the clear holding of Davis. 
213  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011). 
